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Meat production and the transport sector contribute almost equally to global warming.
However, unlike the transport sector, in terms of climate change policies meat production
is relatively unregulated. Many scientists have called for a meat tax as a means of redu-
cing consumption but governments and politicians have not responded. Has the law been
an obstacle to the acceptance of a meat tax? To address that question, this article
analyzes three examples of European Union (EU) taxes that could be imposed on the
consumption of domestic and imported meat, and examines them in relation to the inter-
national climate change regime, human rights law, and the legal regimes of the World
Trade Organization and the EU. It shows that, if carefully designed, an EU meat tax is
consistent with these bodies of law. To address adequately the industrial sectors that
give rise to global warming, governments will need to overcome the taboo relating to the
concept of a meat tax.
Keywords: Greenhouse gas tax, Meat consumption, Climate change law, World Trade
Organization (WTO) law, European Union (EU) environmental law
1. introduction
For climate change to be addressed effectively, urgent action is required from all
industry sectors.1 Yet, in spite of the significant contribution of meat production to
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1 Cf. J. Gillis, ‘UN Says Lag in Confronting Climate Woes Will Be Costly’, The New York Times, 16 Jan.
2014, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/17/science/earth/un-says-lag-in-confronting-
climate-woes-will-be-costly.html?_r = 0.
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global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (ranging from 14.5%2 to 51%3), this sector
is relatively unregulated.
From a purely scientific perspective, this regulatory shortfall is surprising.4 Firstly,
sectors emitting at comparable levels, such as transport, are highly regulated.5 Secondly,
it is expected that by 2050, GHG emissions from European Union (EU) agriculture will
rise significantly and eventually represent a third of total EU emissions.6 Thirdly, a
significant reduction in livestock would reduce GHG emissions relatively quickly
compared with measures involving renewable energy and energy efficiency:7 methane,
the major GHG associated with livestock, is 23 times more warming to the atmosphere
than carbon dioxide (CO2), and has a half-life of only about eight years in the
atmosphere compared to at least a hundred years for CO2.
8 Fourthly, substituting for
meat products is a comparatively easy and cost-effective way to reduce GHG emissions.9
Lastly, reducing meat production would have a number of other environmental benefits:
raising livestock is the largest of all anthropogenic land uses, is responsible for over 8%
of global human water use, and is a key factor in the loss of species.10
On the other hand, from an economic as well as a socio-cultural and political
perspective, this regulatory shortfall is entirely understandable. Meat is a favourite
food across the world.11 Moreover, taxes are politically unpopular with interest
groups such as livestock lobbies, so policy makers tend to provide subsidies for ‘clean’
and ‘green’ technologies rather than putting a price on carbon emissions.12 The EU’s
2 P.J. Gerber et al., Tackling Climate Change Through Livestock: A Global Assessment of Emissions and
Mitigation Opportunities (Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO), 2013),
at p. 15.
3 R. Goodland & J. Anhang, ‘Livestock and Climate Change’ (2009) World Watch Magazine, pp. 10–9,
at 14.
4 Many scientists have called for the introduction of a meat tax to mitigate climate change: see, e.g.,
F. Hedenus, K. Mohlin & S. Wirsenius, ‘Greenhouse Gas-Weighted Consumption Taxes on Food as a
Climate Policy Instrument’, in C.D. Soares et al. (eds), Critical Issues in Environmental Taxation,
International and Comparative Perspectives, Vol. VIII (Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 376–92;
W.J. Ripple et al., ‘Ruminants, Climate Change and Climate Policy’ (2014) 4(1) Nature Climate
Change, pp. 2–5.
5 S. Wirsenius, F. Hedenus & K. Mohlin, ‘Greenhouse Gas Taxes on Animal Food Products: Rationale,
Tax Scheme and Climate Mitigation Effects’ (2011) 108(1–2) Climatic Change, pp. 159–84, at 160;
cf. Regulation (EC) No. 443/2009 Setting Emission Performance Standards for New Passenger Cars as
Part of the Community’s Integrated Approach to Reduce CO2 Emissions from Light-Duty Vehicles
(Passenger Car Regulation) [2009] OJ L140/1.
6 European Commission Communication on a Roadmap for Moving to a Competitive Low Carbon
Economy in 2050, COM(2011)112 final, 8 Mar. 2011. See also B. Bajželi et al., ‘Importance of Food-
Demand Management for Climate Mitigation’ (2014) 4(10) Nature Climate Change, pp. 924–9.
7 Goodland & Anhang, n. 3 above, at p. 13.
8 H. Steinfeld, Livestock’s Long Shadow: Environmental Issues and Options (FAO, 2006), at p. xxi.
9 Hedenus, Mohlin & Wirsenius, n. 4 above, at p. 377.
10 Steinfeld, n. 8 above, at p. iii and pp. 270–3.
11 Oxfam International, Pasta, Pizza, or Paella? Global Food Survey Reveals World’s Favorite Foods,
16 June 2011, available at: http://www.oxfam.org/en/grow/pasta-pizza-or-paella-global-food-survey-
reveals-worlds-favorite-foods.
12 W.Nordhaus,AQuestion of Balance (Yale University Press, 2008), at p. 21; Steinfeld, n. 8 above, at p. 222:
livestock lobbies are disproportionately strong, as can be seen by agricultural subsidies amounting to an
average of 32% of total farm income in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) countries.
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approach to climate change regulation generally favours win-win situations in which
regulation creates economic opportunities.13 With regard to agricultural policies, the
EU focuses on better fodder, improved livestock productivity, maximizing the benefits
of extensive farming,14 and so forth – in short, measures in which innovation may
yield economic benefits.
Politically, it has been easier to justify measures to reduce carbon emissions in the
transport sector than in the agricultural sector. Besides promoting innovation, regulation
in the transport sector can rely on the well known and far reaching problem of
dependency on fossil fuels. Moreover, such regulation complements existing air quality
measures to yield improved air quality in cities, as well as other health benefits.15
Reducing meat consumption would also come with many positive side effects, yet
political discussion along these lines is only just beginning. Swedish authorities, in
2013, proposed a first-of-its-kind meat tax to reduce meat consumption on grounds
of climate change,16 and the EU’s ‘roadmap to 2050’ also mentions that it would be
desirable to re-orient consumption towards less carbon intensive food.17
Against this background, this article will aim to address legal issues concerning
three possible designs of a hypothetical EU tax on consumption of domestic and
imported meat. Particular focus will be placed on international climate change law,
World Trade Organization (WTO) law, human rights law and EU law.
Section 2 explains why I use the example of a hypothetical tax on consumption of
domestic and imported meat. Section 3 analyzes whether such a meat tax would
withstand international climate change and trade law. Section 4 examines whether a
meat tax is in accordance with European environmental law and the general EU
principle of proportionality, and Section 5 asks whether a meat tax is in accordance
with the human right to eat. Conclusions are presented in Section 6.
2. eu meat tax on consumption
Meat consumption in the context of climate change could be regulated in various
ways. This article uses the example of a hypothetical EU tax on meat consumption for
each category18 of domestic and imported meat. It could be levied on:
∙ average GHG emissions per unit for each category of meat for all producers on
entire markets19 (Type 1); or
13 V. Heyvaert, ‘Governing Climate Change: Towards a New Paradigm for Risk Regulation’ (2011)
74(6) The Modern Law Review, pp. 817–44, at 832.
14 Commission Communication on the Roadmap to 2050, n. 6 above.
15 Ibid.
16 R. Andersson et al., ‘Hållbar köttkonsumtion Vad är det? Hur når vi dit? Rapport 2013:1’, 22 Jan.
2013, available at: http://www.jordbruksverket.se/download/18.5df17f1c13c13e5bc4f800039403/
En + hållbar + köttkonsumtion.pdf; Spiegel Online, ‘Klimaschutz: Schweden wollen europaweite Steuer
auf Fleisch’, 26 Jan. 2013, available at: http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/service/schweden-will-eu-
weite-steuer-auf-fleisch-a-879794.html.
17 Commission Communication on the Roadmap to 2050, n. 6 above.
18 E.g. ruminant meat, pork, poultry.
19 As proposed by Hedenus, Mohlin & Wirsenius, n. 4 above.
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∙ uniformly based on average GHG emissions per unit for each category of meat
(Type 2); or on
∙ actual GHG emissions per unit of meat of individual producers (Type 3).
This section will address the legal implications of such regulation.
The first reason for utilizing the example of a tax on meat consumption within the
European Union is that meat consumption, which is typically connected with the
average income in a country,20 is significantly higher in developed countries than it is in
developing countries. Meat consumption per person in 2009 was 84.80 kilogrammes
(kg) in the EU, 17.6 kg across Africa and 4.4 kg in India.21 Secondly, the EU is clearly
willing to take action to mitigate climate change, as evidenced by its offers to reduce
GHG emissions by 40% by 2030 compared with 1990 levels,22 and by its prioritization
of climate change among global environmental issues.23 Thirdly, there have already
been calls within the EU to introduce a meat tax to mitigate climate change: the Swedish
authorities have proposed a meat tax to reduce consumption24 and, in its ‘roadmap’ to
2050, the EU mentions that ‘re-orienting consumption towards less carbon intensive
food would be desirable’.25
I propose a tax on meat despite the fact that, in principle, all categories of food
could be subject to taxes on GHG emissions.26 One reason for this is that a tax on
meat promises to be an efficient means of mitigating climate change.27 Meat
alternatives cause only a fraction of the GHG emissions caused by meat.28 Similarly,
vegetable foodstuffs are excluded because of their much lower GHG emissions
per food unit and their lower elasticities.29 Furthermore, within the EU meat
is responsible for 20 times more emissions per kg than milk.30 Lastly, it would also be
20 M. Gehlhar & W. Coyle, ‘Global Food Consumption and Impacts on Trade Patterns’, in A. Regmi
(ed.), Changing Structure of Global Food Consumption and Trade (Economic Research Service/USDA,
2001), at p. 6.
21 FAO Statistics Division (FAOSTAT), see http://faostat3.fao.org/home/index.html#download.
22 European Council Conclusion, 24 Oct. 2014, EUCO 169/14, available at: http://www.consilium.
europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/145397.pdf.
23 E. Morgera, ‘European Environmental Law’, in S. Alam et al. (eds), Routledge Handbook of Inter-
national Environmental Law (Routledge, 2013), pp. 427–42, at 434.
24 Andersson et al., n. 16 above; Spiegel Online, n. 16 above.
25 Commission Communication on the Roadmap to 2050, n. 6 above.
26 Hedenus, Mohlin & Wirsenius, n. 4 above, at p. 385.
27 Wirsenius, Hedenus & Mohlin, n. 5 above, at p. 173; Steinfeld, n. 8 above, p. 269.
28 See C.G. Foster et al., ‘Environmental Impacts of Food Production and Consumption: A Report to the
Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs’, Defra and Manchester Business School,
Dec. 2006, available at: http://www.ifr.ac.uk/waste/Reports/DEFRA-Environmental%20Impacts%
20of%20Food%20Production%20%20Consumption.pdf.
29 Hedenus, Mohlin & Wirsenius, n. 4 above, at p. 385; 1 kg of bread wheat causes 0.8 kg of
CO2-equivalent and 1 kg of potatoes 0.21 kg of CO2-equivalent, compared with 17.4 kg of CO2-
equivalent from 1 kg of sheep and 12.98 kg of CO2-equivalent from 1 kg of beef: see Foster,
n. 28 above.
30 Emissions per kg of meat from beef are 22 kg of CO2-equivalent/kg, while cow’s milk has the lowest
carbon footprint with 1.4 kg of CO2-equivalent/kg: see A. Leip et al., ‘Evaluation of the Livestock
Sector’s Contribution to the EU Greenhouse Gas Emissions (GGELS)’, European Commission, Joint
Research Centre, 30 Nov. 2010, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/analysis/external/live-
stock-gas/exec_sum_en.pdf.
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an effective measure: tests by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations (FAO) on the global agricultural sector31 have confirmed that consumption,
and therefore GHG emissions, would fall with the introduction of a meat tax. It is
estimated that a 7% reduction in current GHG emissions in EU agriculture could be
achieved if €60 per tonne of CO2-equivalent was added to the price.
32
The first reason underlying my proposal for a tax is that a Pigovian tax is
consistent with the regulatory emphasis on economic incentives in the Kyoto
Protocol.33 Economic incentives have a number of important economic and
environmental advantages over command regulation.34 Firstly, command and
control regulation is rarely politically feasible. Secondly, the existing market
failure – excessive meat consumption is attributable to the fact that the meat industry
and meat consumers do not internalize the consequences of their GHG emissions35 –
could be relatively easily resolved by governments through taxation.36 Thirdly, taxes
provide signals to ‘get the prices right’.37
Getting the prices right would imply taxation to be levied on actual GHG emissions
per kg of meat. This would mean designing the meat tax as an emissions tax as opposed
to an output tax. For the latter, the content of GHG emissions is related to but not
perfectly correlated with the emissions.38 However, a meat tax on output is preferable to
a tax on actual emissions39 because of high monitoring costs, limited options for
reducing emissions apart from reduced production (technical potential is limited), and
high substitution possibilities.40 Thus, a better option is an output tax that is
differentiated depending on the GHG emission levels per unit of meat for each category
of meat, which is based on average emission levels for all meat producers within an
entire market, rather than on specific emission levels of individual producers.41 In this
spirit, Swedish authorities have suggested a tax of €1.50 per kg of beef.42
31 Email from H. Attariwala, Customer Contact Unit, Department for Environment, Food and Rural
Affairs (Defra), 19 July 2013.
32 Wirsenius, Hedenus & Mohlin, n. 5 above, at p. 173.
33 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto (Japan),
10 Dec. 1997, in force 16 Feb. 2005, available at: http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php.
34 See R.B. Stewart, ‘Instrument Choice’, in D. Bodansky, J. Brunnée & E. Hey (eds), Oxford Handbook
of International Environmental Law (Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 150–81, at 155–6.
35 Steinfeld, n. 8 above, at p. 223; J.N. Galloway et al., ‘International Trade in Meat: The Tip of the Pork
Chop’ (2007) 36(2) Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, pp. 622–9; see R. Baldwin, M. Cave &
M. Lodge, Understanding Regulation; Theory, Strategy, and Practice (Oxford University Press, 2012),
at p. 18.
36 Cf. J. de Cendra de Larragán, Distributional Choices in EU Climate Change Law and Policy: Towards
a Principled Approach? (Kluwer Law International, 2011), at p. 365.
37 K. Kosonen & G. Nicodème, ‘The Role of Fiscal Instruments in Environmental Policy’, in Soares et al.,
n. 4 above, pp. 3–20, at 5.
38 Hedenus, Mohlin & Wirsenius, n. 4 above, at p. 378.
39 A. Schmutzler & H. Goulder, ‘The Choice Between Emission Taxes and Output Taxes under Imperfect
Monitoring’ (1997) 32(1) Journal of Environmental Economics & Management, pp. 51–64.
40 Hedenus, Mohlin & Wirsenius, n. 4 above, at pp. 378–9.
41 Ibid., at p. 380.
42 Spiegel Online, n. 16 above.
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That said, because the competitiveness of the EU agricultural sector is likely to be
affected by the implementation of unilateral environmental taxes,43 and because of
the possibility of carbon leakage, it is crucial to levy the meat tax on both domestic
and imported meat (through border tax adjustment on imports44). Therefore, the tax
should be imposed on consumption rather than production.45 Since meat is an
everyday product with a relatively short shelf life, we may presume that the risk
of the emergence of an unregulated market in untaxed meat within the regulated
jurisdiction is small. However, even where taxes are levied on consumption,
carbon leakage cannot be entirely avoided because decreased demand for meat
within the EU would reduce world meat prices and result in increased meat
consumption in non-EU countries.46 It is thought that if the EU reduces
meat consumption by 20%, international livestock prices would be reduced by
between 3% and 11%, which would cause meat consumption in the rest of the world
to rise slightly.47
The following sections will analyze whether a meat tax on the consumption of
domestic and exported meat (hereinafter ‘the meat tax’) is legally permissible,48
covering both the possibility of an output tax (levied on average GHG emissions per
unit of meat category) and an emissions tax (levied on the actual GHG emissions).
3. a meat tax under international law
3.1. Conflict with International Climate Change Regulation?
Within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)49
all parties have committed to implement national and regional programmes to
mitigate climate change50 in all relevant sectors, including agriculture.51 Developed
countries, such as those within the EU, are obliged to adopt policies to limit their
GHG emissions to return to earlier levels of anthropogenic emissions.52 Some see this
obligation as binding.53 Although the UNFCCC is silent on how this return to earlier
43 D. Kletzan-Slamanig et al., ‘Ecological Tax Reform for Austria: An Evaluation of Economic and Emission
Effects’, in Soares et al., n. 4 above, pp. 57–75, at 60.
44 A border tax adjustment consists of two situations: (i) the imposition of a tax on imported products,
corresponding to a tax borne by similar domestic products, and/or (ii) the refund of domestic taxes
when products are exported; cf. GATT Working Party, ‘Border Tax Adjustments’, Report of the
Working Party, L/3464, Dec. 1970, available at: http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/gattpanels/
bordertax.pdf. This work concentrates on the former.
45 Wirsenius, Hedenus & Mohlin, n. 5 above, at p. 6; Hedenus, Mohlin &Wirsenius, n. 4 above, at p. 384.
46 Wirsenius, Hedenus & Mohlin, n. 5 above, at p. 164.
47 Attariwala, n. 31 above.
48 This is of particular importance with regard to the WTO analysis at Section 3.2 below.
49 New York (NY) US, 9 May 1992, in force 21 Mar. 1994, available at: http://unfccc.int.
50 Ibid., Art. 4(1)(b).
51 Ibid., Art. 4(1)(c).
52 Ibid., Art. 4(2).
53 R. Verheyen, Climate Change Damage and International Law: Prevention, Duties, and State
Responsibility (Martinus Nijhoff, 2005), at pp. 56–8 and 236; C. Voigt, ‘State Responsibility for
Climate Change Damages’ (2008) 77 Nordic Journal of International Law, pp. 1–22, at 6.
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levels should be achieved,54 it does regard measures in the agricultural sector as
relevant55 and it explicitly allows for unilateral measures.56 Unilateral mitigation
measures in the agricultural sector are thus supported by the UNFCCC as long as they
are in accordance with the ‘polluter pays’ principle and the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities, and provided there is no ‘arbitrary or unjustified
discrimination or disguised restriction on international trade’ (Article 3(5) UNFCCC).
Clearly, a meat tax would be an application of the ‘polluter pays’ principle,
according to which those who cause damage to the environment should bear the cost
of rectifying that damage,57 and taxes are an important means of promoting this
principle.58 Although the ‘polluter pays’ principle is not explicitly mentioned in the
UNFCCC,59 it is regarded by many as a customary rule of international law60 and is
therefore commonly associated with the UNFCCC.
Principle of common but differentiated responsibilities
On the other hand, a key principle in the climate change regime (albeit not legally
enforceable61) is the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities.62 Article
3(1) UNFCCC states that ‘[t]he Parties should protect the climate system … in
accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective
capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the lead in
combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof’. In implementing measures
within the EU to combat climate change, this principle of common but differentiated
responsibilities has to be taken ‘into account’.63 The principle includes two elements:
54 D. Freestone, ‘The International Climate Change Legal and Institutional Framework: An Overview’, in
D. Freestone & C. Streck (eds), Legal Aspects of Carbon Trading: Kyoto, Copenhagen, and Beyond
(Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 3–34, at 6; Stewart, n. 34 above, at p. 171.
55 Art. 4(1)(c) UNFCCC.
56 M. Hertel, ‘Climate-Change-Related Trade Measures and Article XX: Defining Discrimination in Light
of the Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities’ (2011) 45(3) Journal of World Trade,
pp. 653–78, at 662; Art. 3(5) UNFCCC.
57 S. Kravchenko et al., ‘Principles of International Environmental Law’, in Alam et al., n. 23 above,
pp. 43–60, at 50.
58 C. Coffrey and J. Newcompte, ‘The Polluter Pays Principle and Fisheries: The Role of Taxes and
Charges’, Institute for Environmental Policy, at p. 1, available at: http://www.ieep.eu/assets/238/
thepolluterpaysprincipleandfisheries.pdf.
59 However, see Principle 16 of the Rio Declaration (Rio de Janeiro (Brazil), 3–14 June 1992, UN Doc.
A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), 14 June 1992, available at: http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/
aconf15126-1annex1.htm): ‘National authorities should endeavour to promote the internalization of
environmental costs and the use of economic instruments, taking into account the approach that the
polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution, with due regard to the public interest and
without distorting international trade and investment’.
60 Kravchenko, n. 57 above, at p. 51.
61 Hertel, n. 56 above, at p. 665; P. Cullet, ‘Differential Treatment in International Law: Towards a New
Paradigm of Inter-state Relations’ (1999) 10(3) European Journal of International Law, pp. 549–82, at
575; L. Rajamani, Differential Treatment in International Environmental Law (Oxford University
Press, 2006), at pp. 158–60; Y. Matsui, ‘Some Aspects of the Principle of Common but Differ-
entiated Responsibilities’ (2002) 2(2) International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and
Economics, pp. 151–71, at 167.
62 Kravchenko, n. 57 above, at p. 55.
63 Art. 4 (1) UNFCCC.
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on the one hand, the common responsibility of states with regard to the ‘change in the
Earth’s climate and its adverse effects’, which is a common concern of humankind;64
and, on the other hand, the contribution of each individual state to the creation of
particular environmental problems and their individual abilities to prevent, reduce,
and control the threat. In practice, the latter leads to environmental standards which
impose differing obligations on states.65
All three types of a meat tax would affect the quantity of meat sales – and therefore
the GHG emissions of meat production – not only within the EU (with regard to
domestic products) but also from developing countries. It could be argued, therefore,
that such a tax would place a disproportionate burden on developing states as they
have lesser obligations to fulfil. For example, with regard to the (currently
suspended66) EU aviation scheme, which included EU and non-EU airlines alike,
the EU was accused of failing to reflect adequately the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities.67
However, unlike the aviation scheme, a meat tax would not impose any
obligations on meat producers within developing countries.68 Moreover, it would
not require developing countries to adopt GHG mitigation policies that are
comparable in effect with those adopted by developed countries.69 Furthermore,
the wider context should always be kept in mind: the ultimate objective of the
UNFCCC is to identify the best way to avoid dangerous anthropogenic climate
change.70 Moreover, the UNFCCC requires developed countries, on the basis of
specific commitments,71 to provide financial assistance, to transfer technology, and to
build capacity to support the implementation of adaptation action in developing
countries.72 It does not prohibit unilateral measures that potentially affect developing
countries.
Therefore, so as not to undermine developing countries’ faith in the UNFCCC,73
differentiated responsibilities should be accomplished by other means. This could be
achieved, for example, by transferring tax revenue to the developing countries,
64 Ibid., Preamble.
65 P. Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law (Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 233–4.
66 Decision No. 377/2013/EU derogating temporarily from Directive 2003/87/EC Establishing a Scheme
for Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading within the Community [2013] OJ L 113/1.
67 See O. Ruppel, ‘Intersections of Law and Cooperative Global Climate Governance – Challenges in the
Anthropocene’, in O. Ruppel, C. Roschmann & K. Ruppel-Schlichting (eds), Climate Change: Inter-
national Law and Global Governance, Vol. II: Policy, Diplomacy and Governance in a Changing
Environment (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2013), pp. 29–94, at 79.
68 Cf. D.H. Regan, ‘How to Think About PPMs (and Climate Change)’, in T. Cottier, O. Nartova &
S.Z. Bigdeli (eds), International Trade Regulation and the Mitigation of Climate Change (World Trade
Forum, 2009), pp. 97–123, at 113 and 116.
69 Cf. Hertel, n. 56 above, at p. 654, who argues that measures that require a comparable effort are likely
to be prohibited under the UNFCCC.
70 Ruppel, n. 67 above, at p. 79.
71 D. Bodansky, ‘The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary’
(1993) 18(451) Yale Journal of International Law, pp. 451–558, at 505.
72 Kravchenko, n. 57 above, at pp. 55–6; Decision 2/CP.15, Copenhagen Accord Art. 3, UN Doc. FCCC/
CP/2009/L.7, 18 Dec. 2009; Art. 4(3)–(5) UNFCCC.
73 Hertel, n. 56 above, at p. 678.
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enabling them to implement technical GHG emissions reduction measures.74
Moreover, removing subsidies to domestic producers could help to mitigate
poverty and socio-economic inequality within many of these developing countries.75
Unilateral trade measures under Article 3(5) UNFCCC
What is the meaning of Article 3(5) UNFCCC in the context of the climate change
regime? Does it prohibit a meat tax? The clause that ‘unilateral trade measures should
not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised
restriction on international trade’76 is neutral in effect, as it does not define the types
of trade measure that constitute ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable’ discrimination or are a
‘disguised restriction on trade’.77 Hertel states that the concrete answer to this
question was left for UNFCCC parties to determine at a later stage.78 Guidance could
be sought from the WTO regime: the wording of Article 3(5) UNFCCC and the
chapeau of Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)79 are
similar, and some argue that the two provisions should be interpreted similarly.80
However, the scope of Article 3(5) UNFCCC cannot be broader than Article XX
GATT because the clause was included in the UNFCCC to ensure that mitigation
measures taken by parties are consistent with the principles of the WTO regime.81 In
addition, the UNFCCC aims primarily to mitigate climate change. Logically, it cannot
then go further in protecting free trade than WTO laws, which aim primarily to
protect free trade unless explicitly stated otherwise. Thus, if unilateral trade measures
are compliant with GATT rules or justified under Article XX GATT,82 no separate
issues arise under Article 3(5) UNFCCC.83
74 Cf. Directive 2008/101/EC amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to include Aviation Activities in the
Scheme for Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading within the Community [2009] OJ L 8/3,
Art. 3d(4), which states: ‘It shall be for Member States to determine the use to be made of revenues (...).
Those revenues should be used to tackle climate change in the EU and third countries, inter alia, to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions, to adapt to the impacts of climate change in the EU and third
countries, especially developing countries, (...)’
75 Ruppel, n. 67 above, at p. 77.
76 Art. 3(5) UNFCCC.
77 Bodansky, n. 71 above.
78 Hertel, n. 56 above, at p. 662.
79 Marrakesh (Morocco), 15 Apr. 1994, in force 1 Jan. 1995, available at: http://www.wto.org/english/
docs_e/legal_e/06-gatt_e.htm.
80 E. Denters, ‘Free Riders, Claims and Countermeasures in Combating Climate Change’, in N. Schrijver
& F. Weiss (eds), International Law and Sustainable Development: Principles and Practice (Martinus
Nijhoff, 2004) pp. 231–50, at 244.
81 J. Werksman, J.A. Bradbury & L. Weischer, ‘Trade Measures and Climate Change Policy: Searching for
Common Ground on an Uneven Playing Field’, World Resources Institute, WRI Working Paper, Dec.
2009, at pp. 5–6, available at: http://pdf.wri.org/working_papers/trade_measures_and_climate_change.pdf.
82 See ‘Justification under Article XX GATT’, Section 3.2 below, for legal analysis of Art. XX GATT.
83 It remains possible, as some authors suggest, that the UNFCCC may play a role as an interpretative
tool for the GATT rules. There are a multitude of views on this point. Ultimately, however, it is
doubtful that unilateral trade measures on the grounds of carbon leakage could be sanctioned
meaningfully through the climate change regime given the weak dispute settlement mechanisms of the
UNFCCC: Hertel, n. 56 above, at pp. 662–3; Third World Network, ‘Unilateral Trade Measures to
Protect Climate Change Violate Climate Treaty – Say Developing Countries’, TWN News Update,
Aug. 2009, at p. 1, available at: http://www.twnside.org.sg.
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A meat tax under the Kyoto Protocol
The meat tax is in accordance with the Kyoto Protocol, which covers the gases
emitted by livestock production84 and explicitly includes the agricultural sector.85
The measures named in the Protocol to reach its targets for Annex I countries are
either national measures86 or are ‘market mechanisms’, which consist of emissions
trading, Joint Implementation, and the Clean Development Mechanism.87 A regulation
of the consumption of meat through a meat tax could qualify as a national measure. The
EU might hesitate to implement measures that cause extraterritorial GHG reductions as
they do not count towards its own emissions reduction target,88 but the Kyoto Protocol
does not prohibit such a tax. The same applies to the Doha Amendment to the
Protocol.89
3.2. A Barrier to International Free Trade?
A meat tax must not only be in accordance with the international climate change regime,
but also with WTO law. This regime is completely independent of the international
climate change regime.90 However, following the Vienna Convention,91 the UNFCCC
and the Kyoto Protocol could be applied in interpreting the rules of WTO law.92
If the EU were to act to mitigate global climate change with a meat tax, this would
raise the following issues in WTO law. In the first place, when a tax is imposed the
revenue gain to the importing country will generally be lower than would be the case
without such a tax, and the EU is therefore implicitly expanding its mitigation efforts
to countries outside the EU. Secondly, transaction costs of taxation arise. These costs
are not limited to the government in its role as tax collector, but extend indirectly to
international meat producers.93 Finally, food production in non-EU countries
sometimes causes higher GHG emissions than equivalent production within the
EU. This is especially true of cattle meat production in the tropics.94 Thus, if a meat
tax results in a higher burden for such countries, de facto discrimination might arise.
84 Annex A Kyoto Protocol.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid., Art. 6, para. 1 lit. (d).
87 Ibid., Arts 6, 12 and 17; Freestone, n. 54 above, pp. 12–7.
88 Cf. Art. 3(1) Kyoto Protocol.
89 Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC, 8 Dec. 2012, Doha (Qatar), not yet in force,
Art. 1A.
90 M. Friedrich, WTO und Klimaschutz, Konflikte und Synergien zwischen nationalen Klimaschutzmassnah-
men und dem WTO-Recht (Peter Lang, 2012), at p. 29.
91 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Vienna (Austria), 23 May 1969, in force 27 Jan. 1980,
available at: https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201155/volume-1155-I-18232-
English.pdf.
92 Friedrich, n. 90 above, at p. 31.
93 J. Pavel & L. Vitek, ‘Environmental Tax Reform: Administrative and Compliance Costs of Energy
Taxes in the Czech Republic’, in Soares et al., n. 4 above, pp. 76–88, at 78–9.
94 Hedenus, Mohlin & Wirsenius, n. 4 above, at p. 380; C. Cederberg, et al., Top-Down Life Cycle
Accounting of Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Use of Land and Energy of Brazilian Beef Exported to
Europe (Swedish Institute for Food and Biotechnology (SIK), 2009). Emissions intensities for the same
livestock product vary largely between different regions of the world, whereby Europe and North America
have lower emissions intensities than Africa, Asia, and Latin America: see Working Group III contribution
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As meat is an agricultural product, the question arises whether the applicable law
within the WTO framework covers only the GATT or includes the Agreement on
Agriculture (AoA).95 For a long time, agriculture had been accorded special treatment
in the GATT.96 The Uruguay Round of the AoA marked a systemic shift97 and made
important strides in creating open markets for agricultural products.98 It established
binding commitments in three areas: reductions in farm export subsidies,99 an
increase in import market access for developing countries,100 and cuts in domestic
producer subsidies in developed countries.101 In areas not specifically covered by the
AoA, the provisions of the GATT apply.102
A tax on meat consumption is neither a domestic producer subsidy nor an export
subsidy.103 Furthermore, the AoA Market Access provision104 could even facilitate the
imposition of a meat tax: a country that applies tariffs below the bound rates that resulted
from the AoA may increase those without violating its commitments.105 However, even
then the most-favoured treatment principle applies.106 Essentially, if a meat tax was found
to be compliant with the GATT, no separate issues would arise under the AoA.
Unilateral trade measures such as an EU meat tax on domestic and imported meat
are permissible under certain circumstances according to the rules of the GATT.
Firstly, they must be eligible for border tax adjustment. Secondly, they may not
discriminate between imports from another country and the country’s own products
(‘national treatment’: Article III GATT). Similarly, all other countries must be treated
equally (‘most-favoured nation’:107 Article I GATT).108 Thirdly, if a violation of
to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), ‘Climate
Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change’, Ch. 11 ‘Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use
(AFOLU)’, final draft, 2014, at p. 35, available at: http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg3.
95 Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), 15 Apr. 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1A, available at: http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/14-ag_01_e.htm.
96 M.R. Grossman, ‘The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture and Domestic Support’, in
M.N. Cardwell, M.R. Grossman & C.P. Rodgers (eds), Agriculture and International Trade Law,
Policy and the WTO (CABI, 2003), pp. 27–48, at 27.
97 J.A. McMahon & M.G. Desta, ‘The Agreement on Agriculture: Setting the Scene’, in J.A. McMahon
& M.G. Desta (eds), Research Handbook on the WTO Agriculture Agreement: New and Emerging
Issues in International Agricultural Trade Law (Edward Elgar, 2012), pp. 1–44, at 1.
98 Grossman, n. 96 above, at p. 27.
99 Export Competition: Art. 8 AoA.
100 Market Access: Art. 4 AoA.
101 Domestic Support: Art. 6 AoA; S.P. Subedi, ‘Managing the “Second Agricultural Revolution” through
International Law’, in Schrijver & Weiss, n. 80 above, pp. 161–84, at 167; B. Jack, Agriculture and
EU Environmental Law (Ashgate, 2009), pp. 240–1.
102 Art. 21.1 AoA; European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas
(EC – Bananas III), Appellate Body Report, WTO Doc. DS27/AB/R, 9 Sept. 1997, at pp. 69–70.
103 The same applies (even) to the elimination of indirect taxes on exports: see R.A. Westin, Environ-
mental Tax Initiatives and Multilateral Trade Agreements: Dangerous Collisions (Kluwer Law
International, 1997), at p. 152.
104 Art. 4 AoA.
105 D. Blandford, ‘Climate Change Policies for Agriculture and WTO’, in McMahon & Desta (eds), n. 97
above, pp. 223–49, at 231.
106 Ibid.
107 Art. I GATT.
108 World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO (World Trade Organization, 2011), at p. 66.
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GATT non-discrimination rules occurs, justification must be sought under the general
exception clause of Article XX GATT.
Eligibility of meat tax for border tax adjustment
Only indirect taxes – taxes that are applied to products and not producers – may be
adjusted at the border.109 Only these taxes incorporate the ‘destination principle’
(that products should be taxed only in the country of consumption) reflected by the
provisions of the GATT in respect of border tax adjustments.110
When a tax is uniformly levied on demand of a certain product, it may qualify as
an indirect tax adjustable at the border under Articles II:2(a) and III:2 GATT.111
Border tax adjustment is normal international practice in such cases.112 For example,
many countries adjust domestic taxes on cigarettes, alcohol or fossil fuels.113
However, if a tax were to be levied on the GHG emissions associated with a
certain product rather than on the product itself, the situation would be less clear.
There is no case law so far that answers the question of whether such taxes could still
qualify as indirect taxes (and therefore as taxes ‘on the product’). In the US –
Superfund case, the WTO Dispute Settlement Panel left open the question of whether
or not input, to which the tax is applied, must be physically present in the final
product.114 Academic views with regard to carbon taxes differ.115 In Mexico – Taxes
on Soft Drinks, the Panel found that Article III:2 GATT ‘requires some connection,
even if indirect, between the respective taxes (…), on the one hand, and the taxed
product, on the other’.116 Most authors argue that carbon taxes (and the same must
apply to GHG emission taxes) are indirect product taxes, provided there is a ‘nexus’
between tax and product.117 There is a close nexus between a meat tax and meat
products for two reasons. Firstly, the tax is paid by consumers and not by producers,
which is a characteristic of an indirect tax. Secondly, by internalizing the social cost of
carbon, the intention is to limit the consumption of GHG-emission intensive products
109 A. Müller, T. Cottier & R. Matteotti, ‘Border Tax Adjustments, Can Energy and Carbon Taxes be
Adjusted at the Border?’, Ecoplan/World Trade Institute, Universität Bern/ Rechtswissenschaftliches
Institut der Universität Zürich, 6 June 2013, at p. 84, available at: http://www.efv.admin.ch/e/
downloads/finanzpolitik_grundlagen/els/Ecoplan_2013_e.pdf; P. Demaret & R. Stewardson, ‘Border
Tax Adjustments under GATT and EC Law and General Implications for Environmental Taxes’
(1994) 28(4) Journal of World Trade, pp. 5–65, at 5; GATT Working Party, n. 44 above.
110 Westin, n. 103 above, at pp. 67 and 69.
111 Müller, Cottier & Matteotti, at n. 109 above, at p. 84.
112 Ibid.
113 L. Tamiotti et al., Trade and Climate Change (World Trade Organization and United Nations
Environment Programme, 2009), at p. 100, available at: http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/
trade_climate_change_e.pdf.
114 United States – Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances (US – Superfund), Panel Report,
WTO Doc. L/6175 - 34S/136, 17 June 1987.
115 Müller, Cottier & Matteotti, n. 109 above, at p. 87.
116 Mexico – Tax Measures on Soft Drink and Other Beverages (Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks), Panel
Report, WTO Doc. WT/DS308/R, 7 Oct. 2005, at p. 121.
117 C. Kaufmann, ‘Carbon-related Border Tax Adjustment: Mitigating Climate Change or Restricting
International Trade?’ (2011) 10(4) World Trade Review, pp. 497–525, at 500.
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like meat.118 Arguably, therefore, a WTO Dispute Settlement Panel would see all
three types of the meat tax as eligible for border tax adjustment.
National treatment
To be WTO-compliant, a meat tax must be consistent with the national treatment
obligation under Article III:2 GATT.119 To this end, it must first be examined
whether the domestic and the imported products are ‘like products’.120 Secondly, it
must be determined whether domestic and imported like products are treated
differently.121 Under a meat tax uniformly levied on average GHG emissions per unit
for each category of domestic and imported meat, no distinction is drawn between
imported and domestic products. For this type of tax, no issues arise under the
national treatment obligation. Consequently, the following remarks relate only to
scenarios in which a meat tax is levied on actual or on market-based average GHG
emissions of a certain meat product, and the tax is higher for imported products
(meat from the tropics, for example) than for domestic products.
To determine whether products are considered ‘like products’, four categories of
‘characteristics’ that products might share have been formulated: (i) their physical
properties; (ii) consumers’ tastes and habits; (iii) the products’ end-uses in a certain
market; and (iv) the international classification of products for tariff purposes.122
Within these parameters, are GHG-intensive meat (from the tropics, for example) and
domestic low-GHG meat ‘like’ products? Can differences in the way in which two
products are produced (so-called ‘non product-related processes and production
methods’ (PPMs)) prevent them from being ‘like products’ even if they share all the
relevant characteristics (apart from possibly consumer preferences), and even though
GHG emissions are not traceable in the final meat product?
In EC – Asbestos, the Appellate Body found health concerns in the form of consumer
tastes and habits to be a decisive factor in assessing the likeness between asbestos and
other types of industry fibre.123 In Automobile Taxes, the Panel held that high-fuel
efficient cars are not ‘like’ gas-guzzling cars.124 The Panel thus legitimized such regulatory
distinctions.125 From these cases, it is arguable that if a product pollutes it is not ‘like’ the
climate friendly product even if the products are physically alike.
118 J. Pauwelyn, ‘U.S. Federal Climate Policy and Competitiveness Concerns: The Limits and Options of
International Trade Law, Nicholas Institute for Environmental Policy Solutions, Duke University,
Working Paper NI-WP-07-02, Apr. 2007, at p. 20, available at: http://climateactionproject.com/docs/
internationaltradelaw.pdf.
119 Müller, Cottier & Matteotti, n. 109 above, at p. 92.
120 Cf. M. Panizzon, L. Arnold & T. Cottier, ‘Handel und Umwelt in der WTO: Entwicklungen und
Perspektiven’ (2010) Umweltrecht in der Praxis, pp. 199–247, at 213.
121 Ibid., at p. 214.
122 GATT Working Party, n. 44 above; European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Asbestos-Containing Products (EC – Asbestos), Appellate Body Report, WTO Doc. WT/DS135/AB/R,
12 Mar. 2001, at p. 38.
123 EC – Asbestos, ibid., at p. 50; Panizzon, Arnold & Cottier, n. 120 above, at pp. 216–7.
124 United States – Taxes on Automobiles (US – Automobile Taxes), unadopted Panel Report, WTO Doc.
DS31/R, circulated 11 Oct. 1994, at paras 5.19–5.38.
125 C.R. Conrad, Processes and Production Methods (PPMs) in WTO Law, Interfacing Trade and Social
Goals (Cambridge University Press, 2011), at p. 201.
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It is, however, questionable whether a claim that GHG-intensive meat is unlike
low-GHG meat would stick. Consumer tastes and habits with regard to consumption of
GHG-intensive meat are not clear, despite the fact that the environmental risk of meat
production is confirmed by extensive scientific evidence.126 In a survey conducted by the
leading German news magazine, Der Spiegel, asking readers’ views on the regulation of
meat consumption through a tax, 68.72% of 15,769 people favoured such a tax.127
This indicates a preference for low-GHG meat. On the other hand, a study by the
European Commission revealed that only 12% of EU consumers look for climate
friendly meat.128 Kysar and Vandenbergh state that this is because public awareness of
the relationship between consumption and climate change is seriously lacking.129
Furthermore, a 2006 FAO Report suggests that society is inadequately informed and
lacks sufficient understanding about the scope of the problem.130 So far, there is no case
law on whether the protection of the environment is a relevant consideration in
examining the likeness of products. Overall, it cannot therefore be excluded that GHG-
intensive meat (whether measured on market average or actual GHG emissions) and
low-GHG meat would be found to be ‘like’ products.
If that is the case, GHG-intensive meat must not be taxed in excess of low-GHGmeat
(Article III:2 GATT), otherwise a violation of the national treatment principle will be
presumed.131 ‘Not in excess’ does not even allow for a de minimis difference in the tax
rate.132 However, justification of a meat tax levied on actual or market-based GHG
emissions that apply different tax rates could still be sought under Article XX GATT.
Most-favoured nation
A meat tax must be consistent with the most-favoured nation treatment obligation
under Article I GATT, which states that a WTO member must give imported like
products from all WTO members the same benefits as are given to like products from
any other country.133 With a meat tax uniformly levied on average GHG emissions
per unit for each category of domestic and imported meat, no distinction is drawn
based on the origin of imported products. Clearly, if a meat tax were to be levied on
average emissions levels for all meat producers within certain markets, this would
infringe the most-favoured nation principle and would need to be justified under
Article XX GATT.
126 See 1. Introduction above, and cf. EC – Asbestos, n. 122 above, at p. 56.
127 Spiegel Online, n. 16 above; these figures were retrieved on 17 July 2013 at 17:40 hours.
128 European Commission, ‘Functioning of the Meat Market for Consumers in the European Union’,
report based on the findings of the ‘Study on the Functioning of the Meat Market for Consumers in
the European Union’, May 2013, at p. 5, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/archive/
consumer_research/market_studies/docs/mms_commission_report_en.pdf.
129 D.A. Kysar & M.P. Vandenbergh, ‘Climate Change and Consumption’ (2008) 38 Environmental
Law Reporter, pp. 10825–33, at 10829.
130 FAO, ‘Livestock’s Long Shadow’ (2006), in Steinfeld, n. 8 above, at p. 282.
131 Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II), Appellate Body Report, WTO
Doc. WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, 4 Oct. 1996, at p. 18.
132 Ibid., at p. 23.
133 Müller, Cottier & Matteotti, n. 109 above, at p. 90.
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A meat tax levied on actual GHG emissions of a certain meat product needs
further analysis. Certainly, origin-based differentiation between like products violates
the most-favoured nation principle. The WTO Dispute Settlement Panel has held that
a derogation from this principle ‘cannot be made conditional on any criteria that are
not related to the imported product itself’.134 With respect to conditions completely
unrelated to origin (such as PPMs) the Panel may find such conditions permissible for
derogation under the most-favoured nation principle135 in the light of the Panel
statement in Canada – Autos.136 Thus, GHG emission-related differentiation between
meat products, regardless of the country of origination, would not violate the most-
favoured nation principle.
Justification under Article XX GATT
Meat taxes levied on actual GHG emissions of certain meat products, as well as meat
taxes levied on average GHG emissions on certain markets, would potentially violate
the GATT non-discrimination rules and would therefore need to be justified on the basis
of Article XX GATT. There is scope for justification under Article XX(g), which allows
Member States to adopt policy measures that relate to the conservation of exhaustible
natural resources or, alternatively, under Article XX(b), which allows policy measures
that are necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health. If the measure falls
within one of these exceptions, it must also fulfil the requirement of the introductory
paragraph (the ‘chapeau’ of Article XX GATT). To be permitted under the chapeau, a
measure must not cause unjustified or arbitrary discrimination between countries where
the same conditions prevail or create a disguised restriction on international trade.
Although climate change mitigation measures have not yet been discussed by
WTO bodies,137 it is likely that a meat tax to mitigate climate change could be
justified under Article XX(b) and/or (g) GATT. For example, in US − Gasoline
the Panel agreed that a policy to reduce air pollution resulting from the consumption
of gasoline concerned the protection of human, animal, and plant life or health
(XX(b))138 and found clean air to be an exhaustible natural resource (XX(g)).139
It would be harder for a meat tax to pass Article XX(b) given the necessity test,
which is far more stringent than the ‘relating to’ test of XX(g).140 In relation to Article
XX(g), the Panel in US − Gasoline found clean air to be an exhaustible natural
134 Belgium – Family Allowances (Belgium – Family Allowances), GATT Panel Report, WTO Doc. BISD
1S/59, 7 Nov. 1952, at p. 9; confirmed in Indonesia – Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile
Industry (Indonesia – Autos), GATT Panel Report, WTO Doc. WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R,
WT/DS64/R, 2 July 1998, at p. 356.
135 Müller, Cottier & Matteotti, n. 109 above, at p. 92.
136 ‘[W]e do not contest the validity of the proposition that Article I:1 does not prohibit the imposition of
origin-neutral terms and conditions on importation that apply to importers’: Canada – Certain
Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry (Canada − Autos), GATT Panel Report, WTO Doc.
WT/DS139/R, WT/DS142/R, 11 Feb. 2000, at p. 360.
137 Tamiotti et al., n. 113 above, at p. 107.
138 United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (US – Gasoline (Panel)),
GATT Panel Report, WTO Doc. WT/DS2/R, 29 Jan. 1996, at pp. 38–9.
139 Ibid., at p. 44.
140 Müller, Cottier & Matteotti, n. 109 above, at p. 101; Friedrich, n. 90 above, at p. 65.
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resource because it was natural and a resource (in that it had value). Although
renewable, the Panel felt it could be depleted and was therefore exhaustible.141
Since climate is defined as the atmospheric conditions over longer periods of time
(or average weather conditions), it is arguably analogous to air quality.142
Furthermore, mitigation measures do not aim to protect just the planet’s
atmosphere, but also to protect plant and animal species that may disappear as a
result of global warming.143 Therefore, a stable climate could be considered an
‘exhaustible natural resource’.
The fact that a meat tax on consumption of domestic and imported meat would
also address GHG emissions emitted outside the EU does not necessarily work against
such regulation. All that is required is a ‘sufficient nexus’ between the GHG emissions
in the importing country and the climate change consequences of such GHG
emissions for the EU.144 This nexus can be established relatively easily: in US −
Shrimp, the United States (US) was permitted to protect turtles in India.145 As the
world’s atmosphere is a global commons and GHG emissions of importing countries
cross territorial borders,146 climate change caused by GHG emissions from meat
production affects not only importing countries, but the EU as well.
The ‘relating to’ test of Article XX(g) GATT requires ‘a close and genuine
relationship of ends and means’ and that the measure is not ‘disproportionately wide
in scope and reach in relation to the policy objective of protection and
conservation’.147 An EU meat tax that puts GHG restrictions on the consumption
of imported (and domestic) meat for the conservation of the planet’s atmosphere and
related climate seems to accurately reflect that relationship.148 Based on cases such as
US − Shrimp and US – Gasoline, where the test was easily met, climate change
legislation should normally pass the ‘related to’ test unless there are blatant
inconsistencies or protectionist features in the legislation.149 It is by no means
necessary to prove that no less restrictive measures exist or that mitigating climate
change is the sole purpose of the measure.150
According to Article XX(g) GATT, climate legislation on imports must also be
‘made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production and
consumption’ (‘even-handedness’).151 As long as the EU imposes broadly similar
141 US − Gasoline (Panel), n. 138 above, at p. 44.
142 Müller, Cottier & Matteotti, n. 109 above, at p. 100; Pauwelyn, n. 118 above, at p. 35.
143 See Tamiotti et al., n. 113 above, at p. 108.
144 See Pauwelyn, n. 118 above, at p. 35; United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products (US − Shrimp), Appellate Body Report, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R, 12 Oct. 1998,
at p. 51.
145 Ibid., at p. 50–1.
146 See Pauwelyn, n. 118 above, at p. 35; Friedrich, n. 90 above, at p. 84.
147 US − Shrimp, n. 144 above, at p. 52.
148 See Müller, Cottier & Matteotti, n. 109 above, at p. 100; Pauwelyn, n. 118 above, at p. 35.
149 Pauwelyn, n. 118 above, at p. 36.
150 Friedrich, n. 90 above, at p. 69; however, there are other views on that issue: see Kaufmann, n. 117
above, at p. 507.
151 United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (US − Gasoline (Appellate
Body), GATT Appellate Body Report, WTO Doc. WT/DS2/AB/R, 29 Apr. 1996, at pp. 17–8.
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taxes on domestic meat, this condition will be met: identical treatment is not
required;152 otherwise, it is difficult to see how a violation of the national treatment
rule would have arisen in the first place.153 Thus, a meat tax on consumption of
imported and domestic meat may differentiate insofar as the tax is levied on actual
GHG emissions per unit of imported and domestic meat.
Finally, even if all of the conditions under the specific paragraph of Article
XX(g) GATT were met, a meat tax that is to be found to violate GATT non-
discrimination rules would also have to fulfil the requirements of the chapeau of
Article XX.154 The chapeau requires that ‘measures are not applied in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between
countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on
international trade’. A meat tax should fulfil the following conditions in order to
comply with the chapeau.
Firstly, such a tax must be sufficiently flexible to avoid ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination’ and must take into consideration ‘prevailing different conditions in
different foreign countries’.155 This might force the EU to differentiate between
countries that already have their own climate policies in place and others that do
not.156 Notably, different countries need not necessarily adopt exactly the same
climate policies in order to achieve a reduction in GHG emissions.157
Furthermore, some argue that the principle of common but differentiated
responsibilities must be taken into account in interpreting the chapeau provisions.
Arguably, this might require developed country parties such as the EU to differentiate
between developing and other countries.158 However, it does not follow that a meat tax
would have to be substantially reduced or discarded. As discussed, there are less restrictive
ways to cope with the principle.159 Moreover, it is debatable whether the (historical)
factors that set countries apart and warrant differentiation in the climate change context
should qualify as ‘prevailing different conditions’ under the GATT.160 This may be why
the term ‘prevailing conditions’ does not feature in the otherwise similarly worded Article
3(5) UNFCCC. That said, whether a party is a member of the Kyoto Protocol is a
relevant consideration when considering prevailing conditions. The fact that the EU
ratified the Kyoto Protocol could compel the EU to exclude from its tax developing
countries that have also ratified it, because developing countries have not (yet161)
152 Pauwelyn, n. 118 above, at p. 36; US − Gasoline (Appellate Body), ibid., at p. 21.
153 US − Gasoline (Appellate Body), ibid., at p. 21.
154 See Pauwelyn, n. 118 above, at p. 37.
155 Ibid., at p. 38; Tamiotti et al., n. 113 above, at p. 109; US − Shrimp, n. 144 above, at p. 63.
156 Cf. Pauwelyn, n. 118 above, at p. 39. In this regard, it is irrelevant whether a country has ratified the
Kyoto Protocol: see Friedrich, n. 90 above, at p. 91.
157 Friedrich, ibid., at p. 90.
158 Cf. Art. 31(3)(c) VCLT, n. 91 above; Hertel, n. 56 above, at p. 654; Friedrich, n. 90 above, at p. 93.
159 See above, Section 3.1. Principle of common but differentiated responsibilities.
160 L. Rubini & I. Jegou, ‘Who’ll Stop the Rain? Allocating Emissions Allowances for Free: Environ-
mental Policy, Economics, and WTO Subsidy Law’ (2012) 1(2) Transnational Environmental Law,
pp. 325–54, at p. 349.
161 A new agreement is to be adopted at the 21st Conference of the Parties in 2015 in Paris (France),
which would be binding on all parties, both developed and developing: see ‘The 2015 Agreement –
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committed to emissions reduction.162 The EU already implements tariff preferences for
goods coming from such countries if they have ‘effectively implemented’ the Kyoto
Protocol.163
Secondly, according to US − Shrimp, ‘good faith efforts’ would be needed from
the EU to negotiate an international agreement with all countries affected before
considering a unilateral approach.164 Thus, the EU may have to propose a meat tax
within, for example, UNFCCC negotiations. However, if negotiations fail, the EU
could impose a meat tax unilaterally: the conclusion of multilateral agreements is not
a prerequisite for justification under Article XX.165
Lastly, the implementation of a meat tax must respect basic fairness and due
process.166 This includes hearing the concerned states and producers with regard to
implemented climate policies and production processes.167 Additionally, the meat tax
must not constitute a ‘disguised restriction on international trade’, which means that
the tax must not result in protectionism.168
The difficulty of meeting the stringent requirements of the chapeau could be
avoided if a meat tax was found to be non-discriminatory and, therefore, in
accordance with the GATT rules. In that situation, the EU would not have to seek
justification.169 Consequently, it might be advisable to levy the meat tax uniformly on
average emissions per unit of meat instead of levying it on actual GHG emissions or
on average emissions in certain markets.
4. a meat tax under eu law
4.1. Conflict with EU Environmental Regulation?
In 2007, political agreement was reached on an EU-wide reduction in GHG emissions
by 20% by 2020.170 The EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) contributes towards
this goal but covers less than half of the GHG emissions. Additional measures are
therefore needed to cover the remaining emissions in areas such as agriculture and
Priorities for 2014’, submission by Greece and the European Commission on behalf of the European
Union and its Member States, Athens (Greece), Feb. 2014, at p. 2, available at: http://unfccc.int/files/
bodies/application/pdf/el-02-28-eu_adp_ws1_submission.pdf.
162 J. Pauwelyn, ‘How to Win a WTO Dispute based on Non-WTO Law: Questions of Jurisdiction and
Merits’ (2003) 37(6) Journal of World Trade, pp. 997–1030; Rubini & Jegou, n. 160 above, at p. 350.
163 Regulation (EC) No. 980/2005 of 27 June 2005 Applying a Scheme of Generalised Tariff Preferences
[2005] OJ L 169/1, Art. 9(1)(b) in conjunction with Annex III Pt B; Permitted by European
Communities – Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, Appellate
Body Report, WTO Doc. WT/DS246/AB/R, 20 Apr. 2014.
164 US − Shrimp, n. 144 above, pp. 65, 68–70.
165 United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products: Recourse to Article 21.5
of the DSU by Malaysia (US − Shrimp Art. 21), Appellate Body Report, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/
RW, 22 Oct. 2001, at p. 42.
166 US − Shrimp, n. 144 above, at p. 74.
167 Friedrich, n. 90 above, at p. 94.
168 Tamiotti et al., n. 113 above, at p. 110.
169 Pauwelyn, n. 118 above, at p. 40.
170 The European Council recently agreed to a 40% reduction target by 2030 compared with 1990 levels:
European Council Conclusion, n. 22 above.
170 Transnational Environmental Law, 4:1 (2015), pp. 153–179
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transport. The target for these sectors would be a 10% reduction in emissions from
2005 levels.171
The EU is competent to legislate in the areas of agriculture and the environment,172
provided the measures are proportionate173 to the objectives of the Treaties.174
Moreover, the sustainable development175 of Europe and of the world176 is one of the
main goals of the EU. The objectives of EU environmental policy are, inter alia:
∙ to preserve, protect and improve the quality of the environment;
∙ to protect human health;
∙ to ensure the prudent and rational utilization of natural resources; and
∙ to promote measures at the international level to deal with regional or worldwide
environmental problems and, in particular, to combat climate change.177
A tax on the consumption of domestic and imported meat, as a means of reducing
European and worldwide GHG emissions and thereby mitigating climate change,
would clearly fall within this objective, as there are no substantive limits to the
exercise of EU environmental competence.178
Moreover, the EU legislator is obliged to apply the environmental principles of
Article 191 TFEU and Article 11 TFEU to EU secondary legislation.179 Article 191
TFEU states that EU policy on the environment shall aim at a high level of protection,
while being precautionary and preventative. It further states that environmental
damage should be rectified at the source and that the polluter should pay. These
environmental principles have enabling and directive functions:180 they enable policy
makers to encroach on basic rights,181 and they direct policy makers to act
comprehensively and deliver a high level of protection.182 The ‘polluter pays’
principle provides the basis for the use of fiscal instruments for environmental
protection.183 As interpreted in the EU, the principle posits that environmental
171 Commission Communication, ‘20 20 by 2020: Europe’s Climate Change Opportunity’, COM(2008)
30 final, 23 Jan. 2008.
172 Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU), 26 Oct. 2012, Art. 2(2) in conjunction with Art. 4(2)(d)
and (e), available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri = OJ:C:2012:326:FULL:
EN:PDF.
173 On the principle of proportionality, see below Section 4.2.
174 Treaty on European Union (TEU) 26 Oct. 2012, Art. 5(4), available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri = OJ:C:2012:326:FULL:EN:PDF.
175 See Art. 3(3) TEU; Arts 11 and 208 TFEU.
176 Art. 3(5) TEU.
177 Art. 191(1) TFEU.
178 Morgera, n. 23 above, at p. 436. It is notable that with regard to provisions of a fiscal nature, the
TFEU (Art. 192) requires unanimous decision making by the Council.
179 De Cendra de Larragán, n. 36 above, at p. 108.
180 G. Winter, ‘Environmental Principles in Community Law’, in J.H. Jans (ed.), The European Con-
vention and the Future of European Environmental Law (Europa Law, 2003), pp. 3–25.
181 For example, the principles of precaution and prevention were considered by the ECJ in the BSE case
to justify the legal measures which prohibited the export of British beef against the farmers’ right to
property: C-180/96, United Kingdom v. Commission [1998] ECR I-2265, at para. 99; see de Cendra
de Larragán, n. 36 above, at p. 109.
182 Winter, n. 180 above. See also Art. 114(3) TFEU.
183 De Cendra de Larragán, n. 36 above, at p. 108.
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protection should not depend on state aid or policies that place a burden on society. It
should not target persons for eliminating pollution to which they did not
contribute.184 Thus, in the Standley case, the European Court of Justice (ECJ)
stated that farmers are not obliged to bear all the costs associated with nitrate
pollution, but only those caused by their own activities.185
In order to pursue a high level of protection, and relying on the ‘polluter pays’
principle, the European Commission could take regulatory action through a tax on
meat consumption. Indeed, it could be argued that there is a duty to regulate.
Moreover, the precautionary principle substantially lowers the threshold needed for
governments to justify action when faced with risks of unknown probability.186 In
any event, the threshold to justify governmental action towards climate change
should be easily met since the risks of climate change are well documented.187
However, the Commission has opted for an alternative approach to environmental
protection through the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).188 One of the measures
introduced to make farming ‘greener’ specifies that farmers obtain financial support
only if they adopt sustainable practices to promote soil quality, biodiversity, crop
diversification and healthy grassland.189 It is questionable whether this measure,
based on incentives for technical improvements, will be effective in mitigating climate
change190 compared with a meat tax.191 The ‘polluter pays’ principle is notably
absent from this measure.
The approach is different from that applied towards the car industry. Although
livestock emissions and emissions from transport produce approximately the same
amount of GHG emissions,192 the car industry faces much stronger restrictions than
does the meat industry. The car industry does not face a loss of financial aid if it fails
to comply with environmental standards, but instead faces penalty payments (‘excess
emissions premiums’)193 if it does not comply with the mandatory CO2 emission
limits set in the Passenger Car Regulation. Furthermore, cars must be furnished with
CO2 emissions data.
194
184 J. Jans & H. Vedder, European Environmental Law (Europa Law, 2008), at pp. 43–5.
185 C-293/9, R v. Secretary of State for the Environment and Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food,
ex parte Standley and Metson [1999] ECR I-2603.
186 De Cendra de Larragán, n. 36 above, at p. 133.
187 Especially within the EU, climate change is no longer a risk with poor probability: see Heyvaert, n. 13
above, at p. 833.
188 Strengthened by agreed amendments in the form of ‘delegated acts’, whereas the first package was
adopted in Mar. 2014: European Commission, ‘The Common Agricultural Policy after 2013’,
29 Aug. 2014, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/cap-post-2013.
189 European Commission, ‘Making Farming Fairer and Greener’, 4 July 2013, available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/news/agriculture/130704_en.htm.
190 Wirsenius et al. state that there is low technical potential for emissions reduction in the agricultural
sector: Wirsenius, Hedenus & Mohlin, n. 5 above, at p. 159.
191 This is estimated to provide a 7% reduction in GHG emissions: see Wirsenius, Hedenus & Mohlin,
ibid., at p. 173.
192 See Section 1 above.
193 Passenger Car Regulation, n. 5 above.
194 Directive 1999/94/EC relating to the Availability of Consumer Information on Fuel Economy and
CO2 Emissions in respect of the Marketing of New Passenger Cars [2000] OJ L 12/16.
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In 2005, the Commission presented a proposal for a Directive that would require
Member States to restructure their passenger car taxation systems to promote
sustainability by reforming the tax bases to include elements related to CO2 emissions
of passenger cars.195 It said that fiscal measures would represent a critical instrument
in achieving CO2 reduction targets.
196 Because passenger cars are a major source of
GHG emissions, the introduction of a CO2-sensitive element would be proportionate
as it serves the need to achieve the global EC objective of reducing GHG emissions. It
would also meet the Community’s commitments under the Kyoto Protocol.197 The
same arguments to promote sustainability could similarly be applied to a meat tax.
Although the proposal found too much political resistance to move forward,198 the
obstacles to its adoption were of a political rather than a legal nature. As climate
change awareness has grown, the prospects of success for a similar measure may have
changed in the intervening years. Consequently, the environmental legal framework
of the EU does not go against regulating the consumption of meat through taxation.
4.2. Violation of the General EU Principle of Proportionality?
Policy makers are not absolutely free to make choices about the distribution of a
policy’s burdens and benefits; the principle of proportionality imposes limits on these
choices.199 The ECJ has held that, generally, the lawfulness of a Directive depends on
whether it is appropriate and necessary to achieve the objectives legitimately pursued
by the law and on whether the disadvantages caused are not disproportionate to the
aims pursued.200 According to Javier de Cendra de Larragán, choices in climate
change policies must stand in rational proportion towards the ends, must fulfil
the need to achieve a rational proportion in the burden sharing between parties
while not impinging in a disproportionate manner upon individual parties, and the
decision-making process should involve all affected parties.201 In general, legal
principles do not require specific political outcomes or pre-determined distributions
of burdens and benefits. However, distributional choices can be assessed against the
principle of equality, which obliges policy makers to justify any departure from
equality in their decision making.202
195 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on Passenger Car related Taxes,
COM(2005)261 final, 5 July 2005.
196 Commission Staff Working Document annexed to the Proposal for a Council Directive on Passenger
Car related Taxes, SEC(2005)809, 5 July 2005, at p. 3.
197 Ibid., at p. 10; Commission Proposal, n. 195 above, at p. 2.
198 The proposal for green circulation taxes has not so far received the required unanimous support of the
Member States, although many of them have unilaterally drawn on its ideas in formulating their car
tax systems: European Commission, Communication on Strengthening the Single Market by
Removing Cross-Border Tax Obstacles for Passenger Cars, COM(2012)756 final, 14 Dec. 2012, at
p. 3; European Commission, ‘Taxation: Clarifying EU Rules on Car Taxes’, 14 Dec. 2012, available
at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-1368_en.htm.
199 De Cendra de Larragán, n. 36 above, at p. 99.
200 See Case C-331/88, R v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte Fedesa [1990]
ECR I–04023.
201 De Cendra de Larragán, n. 36 above, at p. 99.
202 Ibid., at p. 100.
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The principle of proportionality might prevent the regulation of meat consumption
if a meat tax were to be considered unnecessary. There are three ways in which a
regulation might be deemed unnecessary: by the existence of (i) other appropriate
(technical) mitigating measures in the agricultural sector; (ii) appropriate regulatory
measures (such as the ETS); or (iii) measures in other sectors that are judged to be
sufficient to mitigate climate change.
The first possibility finds support in the 2006 FAO Report which suggests technical
options for reducing GHG emissions from livestock.203 Technical options include
sequestering carbon through improved pastures. For methane, the productivity
and efficiency of livestock production can be improved through better nutrition
and genetics and improved manure management. The best way to control N2O
is to maximize the efficiency of human nitrogen use.204 The FAO states that, if
widely applied, these technical solutions could have a high impact on reducing
GHG emissions.205 In its latest report, it estimates that a 30% reduction in
GHG emissions from agriculture would be possible if producers used the technologies
and practices with the lowest emissions intensity.206 However, such options are
expensive.207
The EU plans to concentrate on economic incentives to encourage farmers to
introduce technical measures that reduce GHG emissions per produced unit.208
However, it is not claimed that these economic incentives will suffice to mitigate
climate change. The United Kingdom (UK) Department for Environment, Food &
Rural Affairs (Defra) states that there is, in the longer term, limited scope for further
reductions in GHG emissions because of the difficulty of delivering further efficiency
from complex biological systems. Addressing these challenges would require great
effort and a willingness to consider novel approaches.209 Some argue that output
taxes on emission-intensive agricultural goods would be more efficient than technical
measures in dealing with agricultural GHG emissions.210
Thus, although technical mitigation measures exist, they are not a panacea for
reducing GHG emissions in the agricultural sector to target levels. Hence, it is
extremely unlikely that their existence would call into question the proportionality of
a meat tax.
The second basis on which a meat tax might be deemed unnecessary is in the view
that the Kyoto Protocol and the ETS (the ‘jewel in the EU crown’ of climate change
203 Steinfeld, n. 8 above, at pp. 114–23.
204 Ibid., at pp. 115–23.
205 Ibid., at pp. 221–2.
206 Gerber at al., n. 2 above, at p. xiii.
207 It is suggested that there is no cost-effective way to substantially mitigate methane emissions:
A. Bibbee, Green Growth and Climate Change Policies in New Zealand, OECD Economics
Department Working Paper No. 893 (OECD, 2011), at p. 17.
208 European Commission on Making Farming Fairer and Greener, n. 189 above; Commission
Communication on the Roadmap to 2050, n. 6 above.
209 Defra, ‘2012 Review of Progress in Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions from English Agriculture’,
Nov. 2012, at p. 8, available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/69612/greenhouse-gas-agriculture-report-20121122.pdf.
210 Wirsenius, Hedenus & Mohlin, n. 5 above, at p. 1.
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instruments211) already represent a sufficiently strong system for climate change
mitigation, so that there is no need for such a tax. However, these institutions have been
highly criticized: Prins and his co-authors claim that the Kyoto Protocol has actually
slowed the reduction of GHGs because it has created incentives to transfer production
to areas like China with looser emissions norms, so that emissions have increased
overall.212 They contend that Kyoto threatens to invert the ‘polluter pays’ principle into
‘pay the polluter’.213 During the economic crisis, the efficiency of the Kyoto Protocol
suffered even more. Prins and his colleagues name, as an example, the exclusion of
eastern European countries because of their coal dependency.214 According to
Nordhaus, none of the policies that have been implemented to date are efficient. The
current Kyoto Protocol is seriously flawed in its environmental rationale, is inefficiently
designed, and is likely to be ineffective.215 Similarly, Baldwin claims that the ETS, in the
long term, slows the development of new technologies that may revolutionize
environmental performance.216 Thus, according to academic commentators, it is by
no means certain that current ETSs are sufficient to mitigate climate change so as to
render other measures unnecessary.
The efficiency of current ETSs does not render meat regulation unnecessary.
Nevertheless, political decision makers seem to view a meat tax as an inappropriate
means of reducing climate change, because of its perceived threat to the economy
compared with an ETS, and because of their general reluctance to take measures
which reduce consumption levels. Instead, political decision makers favour ETSs
because they are attractive to different interests – they suit the economically powerful
as well as weaker parties as they can sell allowances.217 The Australian Labour
government introduced carbon taxes in 2012. Both candidates for Prime Minister in
the 2013 elections – Abbott and the Labour party candidate, Rudd – promised to
abolish these taxes because they were perceived to have slowed down economic
growth.218 Rudd suggested an ETS instead.219 Furthermore, although such systems
are inadequate if growing consumption leads to absolute increases in GHG emissions,
the solution so far has generally been to try and improve relative efficiency, rather
than reducing absolute consumption levels.220
211 Heyvaert, n. 13 above, at p. 827.
212 G. Prins et al., How to Get Climate Policy Back on Course (The Mackinder Programme, 2009), at
pp. 3 and 8.
213 Ibid.
214 Ibid., at p. 8.
215 Nordhaus, n. 12 above, at p. 18.
216 R. Baldwin, ‘Regulation Lite: The Rise of Emissions Trading’ (2008) 2(2) Regulation and Govern-
ance, pp. 193–215, at 212.
217 R. Baldwin, M. Cave & M. Lodge, Understanding Regulation; Theory, Strategy, and Practice
(Oxford University Press, 2012) at p. 222; and Baldwin, ibid.
218 The Abbott government repealed the tax in July 2014: Australian Government, Department of the
Environment, ‘Repealing the Carbon Tax’, available at: http://www.environment.gov.au/climate-
change/repealing-carbon-tax.
219 ‘Australian PM Kevin Rudd Calls Election for 7 September’, 4 Aug. 2013, BBC News Asia, available at:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-23565387.
220 De Cendra de Larragán, n. 36 above, at pp. 414–5.
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The third basis on which a meat tax might be regarded as disproportionate lies in
the assumption that measures in sectors outside agriculture make regulation through
a meat tax unnecessary. Globally, CO2 emissions account for around 75% of the
total anthropogenic emissions. As the energy sector contribution to CO2 emissions is
75%, the main focus has been on reducing emissions in that sector.221 According to
the European Commission, this sector has a high reduction potential: 99% by 2050
compared with 49% for the agricultural sector. However, the latter percentage only
takes into account technical measures, not consumption-related reductions.222 Even
though the Commission stresses the increasing importance of the agricultural sector
in terms of climate policy223 and views the re-orientation of consumption towards
less carbon intensive food as ‘desirable,’ it has not yet suggested the regulation of
meat consumption. It states that if the agricultural sector does not achieve the
projected emissions reduction, other sectors would need to reduce even further,
despite high costs.224
Hence, political decision makers decided to impose the main burden of mitigation
on the energy sector as the largest and most evident contributor of CO2 emissions
rather than on the agricultural sector in general and the meat industry in particular.
They decided in terms of perceived effectiveness225 – the ‘necessity-need’226 – while
disregarding measures leading to a reduction in consumption.
Nordhaus criticizes the fact that some sectors are favoured over others,227 which
may suggest that the current approach is disproportionate. With regard to the
distribution of reductions across industrial sectors, Nordhaus argues that it is
important that the costs of emissions reduction are equalized across all sectors and
countries. He suggests the imposition of harmonized carbon prices that apply
everywhere, either through a universal carbon tax or a cap-and-trade system in
which all countries and sectors participate so that all emissions are subject to trade.228
Near-universal participation in such programmes to reduce GHGs is crucial to
avoid incurring substantial additional costs. Costs of abatement were very low
for the initial reductions of GHGs but they would rise sharply for higher
reductions.229 Hence, according to Nordhaus, the substantial exclusion rather than
inclusion of the agricultural sector from mitigation measures could be qualified as
disproportionate.
Finally, the proportionality requirement could prohibit a meat tax if it
caused disadvantages to the consumer that were disproportionate to the aims
221 Steinfeld, n. 8 above, at pp. 114–15.
222 Commission Communication on the Roadmap to 2050, n. 6 above.
223 Ibid.
224 Ibid.
225 See Heyvaert, n. 13 above, at p. 834, who states that ‘from a regulatory perspective, the
burning question is not whether warming presents an unacceptable risk ... but whether the
arsenal of regulatory instruments designed to control climate change can make a dent in the problem’.
226 Ibid., at p. 825.
227 Nordhaus, n. 12 above, at p. 18.
228 Ibid., at pp. 5 and 17.
229 Ibid., at p. 19.
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pursued.230 In order to determine the tax rate, policy makers have to perform a
difficult balancing act: the rate must be high enough to be effective, but must not be
excessive. However, all Pigovian taxes face calibration difficulties, as Arthur Pigou
himself admitted.231 They should not of themselves deter such regulation, and do not
in the case of other EU policies.232
5. a human right to eat meat?
Finally, the question must be addressed whether regulation of meat consumption
through a meat tax would violate human rights (especially a ‘right to food’ and the
right to private life).
Article 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
explicitly mentions a right to ‘adequate’ food.233 However, the right to adequate
food is not to be interpreted expansively as, for example, mandating the availability
of a minimum package of calories, proteins and other specific nutrients.234 Hence,
an interpretation that there is a right to eat tax-free meat under Article 11 is
far-fetched.
It could be argued that the consumption of meat is subsumed within the right to a
private life.235 However, it is important to differentiate between a prohibition
on eating meat and a tax on meat which results in more expensive meat. Privacy
is a qualified right236 and may be restricted, for example, for the protection
of health or for the protection of the rights of others, which could include the ‘right to
a clean environment’.237 A further possible restriction on the right to privacy
is the right to food itself. Livestock consume more from the total food
supply than they provide: they consume 77 million tonnes of protein contained
in feedstuff that could be consumed by humans, and provide only 58 million
tonnes of protein in exchange. With regard to dietary energy, the relative loss is
230 See R v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte Fedesa, n. 200 above.
231 A. Pigou, ‘Some Aspects of the Welfare State’ (1954) 2(7) Diogenes, pp. 1–11.
232 Cf. Directive 2011/64/EU on the Structure and Rates of Excise Duty Applied to Manufactured
Tobacco [2011] OJ L 176/24.
233 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, New York (US), 16 Dec. 1966, in
force 3 Jan. 1976, available at: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CESCR.aspx.
234 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘General Comment No. 12: The Right to
Adequate Food (Art. 11)’, 12 May 1999, at p. 2, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/
4538838c11.html.
235 E.g., Art. 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), Rome (Italy), 4 Nov. 1959, in
force 3 Sept. 1953, available at: http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf; or
Art. 17(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), New York (US), 19
Dec. 1976, in force 23 Mar. 1976, available at: http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/
ccpr.aspx.
236 See Art. 8(2) ECHR and Art. 17(1) (‘arbitrary or unlawful’) ICCPR.
237 Although such a right is not explicitly stated in international treaties or the ECHR, it is said that
environmental rights should be deduced from other existing human rights: see M.R. Anderson,
‘Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection’, in A.E. Boyle & M.R. Anderson (eds),
Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection: An Overview (Clarendon Press, 1998),
pp. 1–23, at 4. It is, under certain circumstances, in fact entailed, e.g., in Art. 8(1) ECHR: see
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), Hatton and Others v. United Kingdom, Application
No. 36022/97, 8 July 2003.
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even higher.238 Thus, the need to secure food supply would support a reduction in
meat consumption, in favour of alternative, higher yield foods. This is particularly
important because of the expected negative impact of climate change on food
supply.239
6. concluding remarks
It is clear that current efforts to stabilize GHG concentrations in the atmosphere at a
level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate
system (Article 2 UNFCCC) are insufficient. Similarly, it seems clear that there are
few climate change mitigation measures as simple, cost-effective, and with as many
positive side effects as reducing meat consumption. In contrast to, for example,
technical measures in the transport sector, this measure seems obvious. Yet, at a time
when both vegetarianism and meat consumption are increasing, and food cultures are
clashing, a meat tax is a highly contentious issue.
A state is not free in its regulatory choices regarding mitigating climate change. It is
bound by legal restrictions as to the measures available and, at the same time, by its
legal responsibility for environmental protection. This article concentrated on the
former and discussed the legal implications of an EU tax on domestic and imported
meat. It showed that the legal analysis depends on how the tax is to be levied, and
that if carefully designed, a meat tax is proportionate and compatible with
international and EU law.
This article has not discussed in any depth the question of whether the failure to
regulate meat consumption would affect state responsibility for climate change
damage. Nevertheless, this question should be kept in mind. The failure to implement
a meat tax as a mitigation measure is not just a violation of the ‘polluter pays’
principle and the principle of equality. Conflict could occur with regard to the EU’s
human rights duty to protect its citizens against climate disasters,240 and its duty not
to cause transboundary harm.241 Given the clear contribution of meat products to
global warming and the equally clear foreseeability of the damaging consequences of
climate change, the EU should seriously consider such a measure as a means of taking
238 Steinfeld, n. 8 above, at p. 270.
239 O. De Schutter, ‘Climate Change and the Human Right to Adequate Food’, contribution of the
Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food to the meeting convened by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung with
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Geneva (Switzerland), 13 May 2010,
available at: http://www.srfood.org/images/stories/pdf/otherdocuments/20100513_climate-change-
and-the-human-right-to-adequate-food_en.pdf.
240 Future climate change catastrophes will have implications with regard to the right to life and family
life embedded in various human rights treaties, and the positive obligation of states to take appro-
priate steps: see J. Spier, ‘Legal Strategies to Come to Grips with Climate Change’, in O. Ruppel,
C. Roschmann & K. Ruppel-Schlichting (eds), Climate Change: International Law and Global
Governance Vol. I: Legal Responses and Global Responsibility (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2013),
pp. 121–52; ECtHR, Budayeva and Others v. Russia, Application Nos. 15339/02, 21166/02, 20058/
02, 11673/02 and 15343/02, 29 Mar. 2008, in which Russia was held responsible under Art. 2 ECHR
for its failure to implement land-planning and emergency relief policies in the light of foreseeable risk
of a mudslide that would lead to loss of life.
241 On state responsibility for transboundary harm through climate change, see Verheyen, n. 53 above,
and Voight, n. 53 above.
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reasonable care242 towards mitigating climate change.243 Finally, it is important to
note that even if a meat tax does not materialize in the near future, many of the
lessons emerging from this analysis are transferable to proposals regarding the
taxation of other GHG-intensive consumption goods.
242 P. Barton, ‘State Responsibility and Climate Change: Could Canada be Liable to Small Island States?’
(2002) 11 Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies, pp. 65–87, at 78.
243 Cf. Verheyen, n. 53 above, at p. 187 and Voigt, n. 53 above, at p. 18.
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